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Abstract
We observe many episodes in which a large number of people at-
tempt to withdraw their deposits from a bank, forcing it to suspend
withdrawals or even to fail. In contrast with the view that those
episodes are driven by consumers’ panic or sunspots, we propose to
explain them as a consequence of the conjunction of lack of full back
up of deposits by banks, and of an unexpectedly high fraction of with-
drawers. We validate this view in a version of the standard Diamond
and Dybvig [8] model, in which the fraction of impatient consumers
is drawn stochastically according to a continuous density function, by
showing that: (1) when banks are not allowed to suspend payments,
in every symmetric equilibrium where agents deposit banks fail with
strictly positive probability, and (2) in every such equilibrium, fail-
ure occurs whereas patient consumers find it optimal not to withdraw
early. Moreover, we obtain similar results when banks are allowed
to suspend payments, and we show that consumers’ ex-ante welfare
is strictly higher compared to when banks cannot suspend payments.
Our contribution is therefore two-fold: (1) bank failures driven by
large withdrawals can be explained by any fundamental shock that
leads to an high fraction of withdrawers, and (2) suspension of pay-
ments might be a critical part of the protection of the banking system.
∗We would like to thank Bernardino Ada˜o, Beth Allen, Andy McLennan and Warren
Weber for their comments. All remaining errors are ours.
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“[T]he literature that started with Diamond and Dibvig [8] is
unable to explain bank runs until now.” — James Peck, and Karl
Shell [14].
1 Introduction
Throughout history, we observe many episodes of a large number of people
withdrawing their deposits from a bank, forcing it to suspend withdrawals or
even to fail. The standard interpretation, expressed in Diamond and Dybvig
[8], is that those episodes constitute bank runs: all depositors believe that
the banks will fail, making it optimal for all of them to withdraw as early as
possible (i.e., to run to the bank).
An important aspect of a bank run is that depositors lose their confidence
in the banking system: everybody panics and many go to the bank just
because all the others are going. The common explanation expressed in the
literature is that loss of consumers’ confidence is associated with sunspots. In
this paper, we propose an alternative explanation of bank failures driven by
large withdrawals: These will result from the lack of full back up of deposits
in times when the number of depositors in need of funds is unusually high.1
Furthermore, these bank runs can happen even when those who do not need
funds will not panic and go to bank. Hence, we name this non-panic bank
failures.
It is important to note that an unexpectedly large number of withdrawals
will produce an outcome that is observationally equivalent to a bank run: a
large number of people will appear in the bank, and the bank will fail or be
forced to suspend payments. Thus, in practice, it will be difficult to distin-
guish between panic bank runs and non-panic bank failures. However, unlike
bank runs, non-panic bank failures have a simple explanation — in a compet-
itive banking system, banks will choose not fully back their deposits, and so,
an high number of withdrawers will force the bank to fail. Thus, we suggest
that bank failures driven by large withdrawals might have a fundamental
explanation: any fundamental shock that leads to a large number of with-
drawals, such as for instance large layoffs in the workforce, will ultimately
1An alternative and conceptually equivalent view is that banks assets are not liquid
enough to satisfy large demand for withdrawal. Such a situation occurs in the case of bad
loans from banks for instance.
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produce bank failures.2
Furthermore, as Diamond and Dybvig [8] also pointed out, banks can
design deposit contracts capable of removing the incentives that depositors,
not in need for funds, might have to run to the bank. A possible way banks
have to prevent panic bank runs is to keep the right to suspend payments,
a policy that many banks used in the past. Interestingly, in their analysis
Diamond and Dybvig [8] showed that banks following a suspension of pay-
ments policy would not need to suspend withdrawals in equilibrium. Thus,
it is puzzling to observe suspension of withdrawals in practice despite this
theoretical recommendation.
The explanation that we give above can also be used to explain equilib-
rium suspension of payments: since banks choose not to fully back up their
deposits, when the number of withdrawers happens to be unusually high,
banks will be forced to suspend withdrawals.3 In other words, bank failures,
and suspension of payments can occur as an equilibrium phenomenon inde-
pendent of consumers’ panic. Moreover, we show that the higher the interest
rates offered by banks, the higher the likelihood of observing such phenom-
ena in equilibrium. Therefore, as in Diamond and Dibvig [8], we observe a
trade-off between liquidity offered by banks, and bank risk, a fundamental
characteristic of the banking industry.
In more details, we consider an environment similar to the one in Diamond
and Dybvig [8]. Consumers are separated in two distinct types: impatient
consumers in need for liquid assets early, and patient consumers willing to
postpone consumption further. We assume that the fraction of impatient
consumers is random. In contrast with Diamond and Dybvig [8], we assume
that every fraction of impatient consumers may occur with strictly positive
probability, although an high fraction of impatient people is relatively un-
likely.4
Consumers can deposit their initial endowment to a bank, or invest it in
an assets market. Banks offer demand deposit contracts to depositors. The
2Wallace [17] has expressed a related idea in a similar model. See section 2 for a
discussion.
3Note that this argument does not support Friedman’s recommendation that banks
should be required to fully back up their demand deposit contracts (see Friedman [9]
for the details of this statement). In our framework, if banks choose to do so then all
consumers would be strictly worse off from an ex-ante standpoint.
4In the Appendix we show that all of our results extend to the case in which there is
an upper bound less than one on the fraction of impatient consumers.
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banking system is assumed to be competitive; therefore in this case, as Peck
and Shell [14] show, banks are left to maximize consumers’ ex-ante welfare.
We then show that every symmetric equilibrium can be of two distinct
types: either no consumer deposits, or every consumer deposits and patient
consumers do not withdraw early. In every equilibrium such that all the
consumers deposit, a bank failure occurs with strictly positive probability
when the banks cannot suspend withdrawals.
A similar result hold when banks can suspend payments. There are two
types of symmetric equilibria: one in which no consumer deposits, and an-
other in which every consumer deposits and every patient consumer does
not withdraw their deposits early. Still, in this last type of equilibria, banks
suspend withdrawals with strictly positive probability.
In the above equilibria, suspension of payments, or bank failures, corre-
spond to a situation where the fraction of impatient consumers is unexpect-
edly high. The main intuition behind this result is that banks find it optimal
to offer a positive interest rate, and thus, to provide some risk sharing to
consumers whenever an high fraction of impatient consumers is relatively
unlikely, facing however a failure with relatively small probability (or sus-
pension if allowed). In such case, a large number of consumers withdrawing
their deposits force banks to suspend payments or even to fail.
This type of equilibria reflects some practical features of the banking
system: banks offer liquidity (i.e., a positive interest rate) to depositors,
people deposit, they withdraw only when they have to, and sometimes banks
suspend withdrawals (or fail, if they cannot suspend withdrawals). Further-
more, an equilibrium of this type has the property that no consumer panics,
and still suspension of payments (or bank failure) occurs with strictly pos-
itive probability. In this way, we depart from the traditional explanation
of large withdrawals, bank failures and suspension of withdrawals. This, in
turn, points to an additional fragility of the banking system, as banks can
be forced to suspend withdrawals, or fail, even if the public’s confidence is
maintained.
However, we do not dismiss the possibility that equilibrium bank runs
can occur. As Diamond and Dybvig [8] have shown, bank runs can occur
due to sunspots; this is the case even when banks can suspend withdrawals,
as shown by Peck and Shell [14]. In a model similar to Diamond and Dybvig
[8], Ada˜o and Temzelides [1] have shown that bank runs also occurs in some
particular equilibria, independently of sunspots.
As discussed earlier, suspension of payments is a critical part of the pro-
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tection of the banking system. For instance, this was a feature of the banking
panic of 1907, but was not used during the Great Depression. However, at
the beginning of the twentieth century, suspension of payments were viewed
as undesirable and avoidable (see Wallace [17] for a detailed discussion of
those historical facts). As importantly, we show that suspension of payments
is also beneficial to consumers: we show that consumers’ ex-ante welfare is
strictly higher when banks are allowed to suspend payments. In fact, we
show that symmetric equilibria can be ranked in the following manner: no-
deposit equilibria are strictly Pareto-dominated by deposit equilibria without
suspension of payments, and deposit equilibria without suspension of pay-
ments are strictly Pareto-dominated by deposit equilibria with suspension of
payments. The intuition behind the Pareto superiority of suspension of pay-
ments is that it guarantees (a lower bound for the) consumption to patient
consumers at the cost of reducing the probability that a impatient consumers
will consume. Thus we support Wallace [17]’s recommendation that suspen-
sion of payments might be a critical part of the protection of every banking
system.
2 Related Literature
Our model is very similar to that of Diamond and Dybvig [8]. Even though
bank runs equilibria are not present in our model (every such equilibria are
anticipated by consumers, preventing them from depositing), we establish
the link between assets liquidity, interest rates and risk of bank failure or
activation of suspension of payments.
Another similarity of our work with that of Diamond and Dybvig is on
the type of contract we allow banks to offer to depositors.5 As in their work,
we only study bank contracts that promise to pay the same to all early with-
drawers until the bank fails, or until it fully suspends payments. Recently,
Green and Lin in [10] and in [11] have criticized this simple contracting ap-
proach, by arguing that banks could design contracts that depositors would
prefer to the simple demand deposits of Diamond and Dybvig. A similar ap-
proach is taken by Peck and Shell [14], which considered a class of contract
that includes the simple demand deposits.
5We also assume the same trading restrictions (i.e., that depositors cannot sell their
position at the bank) as in Diamond and Dybvig [8]. The importance of these trading
restrictions have been analyzed by Jacklin [12].
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The reason why we take the simple contracting approach of Diamond
and Dybvig rather than the more general approach of Green and Lin, and of
Peck and Shell is essentially the one put forth in Postlewaite and Vives [15]:
since we observe demand deposits for so long, something in the environment
must make these contracts optimal. Although we do not provide a formal
analysis of what properties would lead to the optimality of deposit contracts
in a Diamond and Dybvig environment, we point out that our message would
remain if we allowed banks to offer at most finitely many consumption levels
to early withdrawers. In this case, we would still obtain that banks failures
occur with positive probability, and that full suspension of payments would
be beneficial to consumers. Assuming that banks can only offer finitely many
consumption levels to early withdrawers seems reasonable; any contract vio-
lating this assumption would be rather hard to manage in practice.67
An important aspect of our paper is that we explain the above phenomena
without referring to exogenous events, such as sunspots. Our view is that
bank failure or suspension of payments are essentially driven by economic
fundamentals, such as a surge in unemployment or poor investment perfor-
mances from banks. One of the appeal of this approach is that explaining
bank failures through sunspots carries the problem that sunspot equilibria
are not robust to a more refined notion of equilibria, as Ada˜o, and Temzelides
[1] have shown.
Also, the idea that panics can occur without involving the whole popula-
tion of consumers was first expressed in a specific example given in Postle-
waite and Vives [15]. In this last reference, consumers find themselves in a
6Since Green and Lin, and Peck and Shell assume a finite number of consumers, this
assumption will be automatically satisfied in their framework. In general, the optimal
allocation in their framework will require as many consumption levels for early withdrawers
as the number of consumers in the model. In a continuum of consumers model like our (and
like Diamond and Dybvig’s) the analog of their optimal contracts would require infinitely
many consumption levels for early withdrawers. We take the view, as in Aumann [2], that
the appropriate mathematical model to capture the intuitive notion of an economy with a
very large number of participants, each of which having a negligible impact (as seems to
be the case with the banking system in developed economies) is a model with a continuum
of participants. In this case, the assumption that the bank can offer at most finitely
many consumption levels to early withdrawers is just a technological assumption like the
sequential service constraint: what is being assumed is that the technology of banks is
such that an optimally organized bank will offer contract featuring these properties.
7Similar ideas are expressed in Carmona [4], in which monetary trading is rationalized
as a Pareto efficient way to obtain certain properties including finite complexity.
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prisoner’ dilemma type of situation in terms of optimal withdrawing time,
and individual decisions to run are based on anticipations of others’ behav-
iors. Nevertheless, the link between macroeconomic fundamentals and bank
failure is not established there, and the main explanation provided by the
authors is that panics are triggered by highly sophisticated reasonings from
consumers. Rather, our view is to emphasize that psychological factors have
less explanatory power than macroeconomic fundamentals.
The main motivation of this paper is very similar to Wallace [17], where
the author makes the following point: “In my model, the cause of a bank
run and a partial suspension is exogenous — an aggregate shock to tastes
that make the number of people wanting to withdraw unusually large.” Still,
this last reference relies on the assumption that there is a small amount
of aggregate risk limited to a small group of individuals. Such a situation
cannot reflect large-scale phenomena such as the Great Depression, and the
explanatory power of this paper does not extend to what we consider to
be the most natural causes of failure of the banking system, as described
in Carmona and Leoni [6]. In contrast, our view allows to give a sensible
explanation to large-scale phenomena missed in Wallace [17].8
Still, we do not dismiss the possibility that bank runs may be a conse-
quence of herd behaviors, as in Chari and Jagannathan [7] and in Jacklin
and Bhattacharya [13]. This view can also be found in Carmona and Leoni
[5], where we show that when consumers observe the number of early with-
drawers, then a large number of withdrawals will trigger panic, and in turn
bank runs by a herd behavior effect. However, we show that such bank runs
have a fundamental origin in economic fundamentals, a point that we want
to emphasize. Some empirical support for this view can be found in Bernake
[3]’s analysis of the US great depression.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 3 we formally describe the
model; in Section 4 we characterize symmetric equilibria and study their
properties when banks are not allowed to suspend payments; in Section 5 we
carry out the same analysis when banks are allowed to suspend payments
8From a methodological point of view, our work is closer to Wallace [16] since the model
we use differs from the one used by Wallace only on the number of consumers (which is
finite in the latter). A more substantial difference is on the restrictions we impose on the
optimal contracting problem: we impose that the contract offered by the bank can offer at
most finitely many consumption levels to early withdrawers, which will have consequences
in our continuum of consumers model. Of course, this assumption does not place any
restriction in Wallace’s model.
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and make explicit the welfare ranking of equilibria studied; finally in the Ap-
pendix we show that the assumption on the fraction of impatient consumers
drawn can be relaxed in the manner described earlier.
3 The model
In this section, we formally describe the model. The model presented here is
very similar to the one presented in Diamond and Dybvig [8].
The model has three periods (T = 0, 1, 2), and a single consumption good.
There is a continuum of consumers; without loss of generality we assume that
the set of consumers is represented by the interval [0, 1]. Every consumer is
endowed with 1 unit of consumption good in period 0.
All consumers are identical in period 0. Every consumer can be of two
distinct types, denoted by type 1 and type 2. A type 1 consumer values con-
sumption in period 1 only (impatient consumer), whereas a type 2 consumer
values consumption both in period 1 and 2 (patient consumer).
In period 1, nature draws a type for every consumer (also called an agent
later). A fraction t ∈ [0, 1] of the consumers will be of type 1. The random
number t is drawn by nature according to a probability distribution f over
[0, 1]. We assume that f is continuous, f(1) = 0, and F (t) < 1, for all
t ∈ [0, 1). Hence, every fraction of impatient consumers may occur, although
an high fraction of impatient people is relatively unlikely. In period 0, the
agents are equally likely to be of type 1 conditional on t, and the density of
probability f is common knowledge among the agents. In period 1, every
agent privately learns his type.
The agents can use their endowment in three different manners. Firstly,
they can deposit in period 0 part of their endowment in a bank. With the
deposit from the agents, the bank uses an investment technology exhibiting
constant returns to scale. With this technology, one unit of consumption
good invested in period 0 yields R (R > 1) units of consumption good in
period 2. If the investment is withdrawn in period 1, the salvage value will
be exactly the value of the investment.
Concurrently to the bank, there exists a storage technology described
next. Every agent can privately store a quantity of consumption good of
his choice in every period, in order to consume it next period. The storage
technology is costless, and provides no return to the agents.
Finally, the agents have access to a competitive market for claims on
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future goods, which is open in every period. In this market, it is shown in
Diamond and Dybvig [8] that the period 0 price of period 1 consumption
is 1, and the period 0 and 1 prices of period 2 consumption are R−1. We
assume that, when the agents are indifferent between depositing at the bank
and investing in the assets market, the agent will always prefer to invest in
the assets market.
Let c1 denote individual consumption of an agent in period 1, let c2 denote
individual consumption in period 2, and let Θ be the type of the agent. The
utility derived by every agent from the consumption of the bundle (c1, c2) is
U(c1, c2,Θ) =
{
u(c1) if the agent is of type 1
u(c1 + c2) otherwise
(1)
where u : R+ → R is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing,
strictly concave, and satisfies the Inada conditions u′(0) =∞, and u′(∞) =
0. Also, we assume the following on the relative risk-aversion coefficient:
−cu′′(c)/u′(c) > 1 for c ≥ 1. We also normalize units so that u(0) = 0. Every
agent is assumed to maximize the ex-ante (relative to period 0) expected
utility E[U(c1, c2,Θ)].
We next describe the banking industry in more details. There is a large
number of banks, behaving competitively (see Shell and Peck [14] for the im-
plications of such an assumption). The banks offer demand deposit contracts
to their depositors; that is, the banks offer to the depositors a contract spec-
ifying a fixed claim of r1 per unit deposited to agents withdrawing in period
1. The banks are mutually owned, and they are liquidated in period 2. This
implies that period 2 withdrawer will equally share among themselves the
remainder of the banks assets.
The banks also satisfy a sequential service constraint ; that is, the banks
must serve the agents withdrawing in period 1 in the order that they arrive
(randomly) at the bank until the bank runs out of assets.
Let A denote the total amount of deposit in period 0, and consider an
agent j ∈ [0, 1] willing to withdraw in period 1. Let fj denote the number of
period 1 withdrawer arriving at the bank before agent j, and let V1 denote
the period 1 payoff per unit deposit to this agent j. We have that
V1(fj, r1) =
{
r1 if fj < r
−1
1 A
0 otherwise.
(2)
Let now V2 denote the period 2 payoff per unit deposit not withdrawn in
period 1, and let f be the number of demand deposits withdrawn in period
9
in period 1. We have that
V2(f, r1) = max
[
R(A− r1f)
1− f , 0
]
. (3)
Denoting by wj the fraction of deposit withdrawn in period 1 by agent j
(for every j ∈ [0, 1]), and assuming that agent j deposits all of its endowment
in the bank, the overall payoff to agent j is then given by
wjV1(fj, r1) + (1− wj)V2(f, r1). (4)
A strategy of the banks is the choice of r ∈ [1, R]; the banks choose r
in order to maximize ex-ante utility of the consumers (recall that they are
equal ex-ante). This behavior is motivated by the competitive nature of
the banking industry (See Shell and Peck [14] for more details on this issue).
More generally, we could assume that the banks offer r ∈ R, but risk-aversion
will ensure that r ∈ [1, R].
Consumers will choose individually whether to deposit (if they don’t,
they will buy claims for future goods), for all possible interest rates the bank
offer. Also, for every possible interest rate, and deposit choice, a consumer
will choose either to withdraw in the first period or to wait, conditional on his
type and others’ strategies. Hence, a strategy for a consumer is d, w, where d
is a function from [1, r] into {0, 1}, and w is a function from [1, R]×{0, 1}×Θ
into {0, 1}. We make the convention that d(r) = 1 stands for the choice of
depositing, and similarly w(r, d,Θ) = 1 means that she will withdraw in
period 1.
In order to evaluate different strategies, each consumer needs to know
the probability of arriving to the bank before this fails. Conditional on the
fraction t of impatient consumers in the population, this probability depends
on the interest rate r offered by the bank, on the fraction s at which the bank
suspends withdraws (if allowed), and on the strategies chosen by the other
consumers. Since we are focusing only on symmetric strategies, it is enough
for a consumer to know this probability in the three following cases: 1)
when all consumers withdraw in period 1, 2) when only impatient consumers
withdraw in period 1, and 3) when he withdraws in period 1 in addition to
all impatient consumers — these functions will be denoted respectively by
αa(r, s|t), αi(r, s|t), and α1(r, s|t). We assume that for all y = a, i, 1, the
function αy is continuous with respect to t, is differentiable with respect to
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s with bounded partial derivative, and that∫ 1
0
αa(r, s|t)rf(t)dt ≤ 1.9 (5)
An equilibrium is then r∗, d∗, and w∗ such that w∗(r, d,Θ) is optimal
for all (r, d,Θ), d∗(r) is optimal for all r, and r∗ is optimal taking as given
agents’ strategies.
A bank failure occurs when the total value of assets withdrawn in period
1 strictly exceeds the total value of assets owned by the bank.
4 Bank Failures
In this section, we characterize the symmetric equilibria where banks are not
allowed to suspend withdrawals, and we study their properties.
We first show that such equilibria can be of two distinct types: either
agents avoid depositing, or deposit and patient agents wait. We also show
that agents’ welfare is strictly higher in the second class of equilibria.
Finally, we show that, in every equilibrium such that every agent deposits,
a bank failure occur with strictly positive probability. Moreover, we show
that this probability is a function of equilibrium interest rates offered by
banks.
For sake of simplicity, we carry out the analysis with the assumption
that every fraction of impatient agents can be drawn with strictly positive
probability. In the Appendix, we show that this assumption can be relaxed
in order to get the following result.
Proposition 1 There are two classes of symmetric equilibria:
1. (autarkic equilibria) no agent deposits; i.e, d∗(r∗) = 0.
2. (non-autarkic equilibria) every agent deposits, all patient agents wait,
and the interest offered by the bank strictly exceeds 1; i.e, r∗ > 1,
d∗(r∗) = 1, and w∗(r∗, d∗(r∗), 2) = 0.
9It will become clear later that the assumptions can be relaxed substantially. See the
appendix for an explicit probabilistic model yielding functions αy, y = a, i, 1 for which all
our resulst hold.
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In every non-autarkic equilibrium, the agents’ ex-ante expected utility is
strictly greater than in any autarkic equilibrium. Furthermore, in every non-
autarkic equilibrium, the banks fail in the first period with strictly positive
probability (given by 1− F (1/r∗)).10
In particular, this proposition shows that in every non-autarkic equilibria,
bank runs can occur even when no patient consumers wishes to withdraw
early. Furthermore, despite the risk of a bank failure, everyone finds optimal
to deposit their endowment in the bank. Because of this two properties, we
label this type of equilibria as non-panic bank failures.
Proceeding with the proof of Proposition 1, we note first that all impa-
tient consumers will choose to withdraw in period 1. Thus, in a symmetric
equilibrium, we have only four possibilities regarding consumer’s behavior:
1. no consumer deposits, and patient consumers withdraw in period 1,
2. no consumer deposits, and patient consumers withdraw in period 2,
3. all consumers deposit, and patient consumers withdraw in period 1,
and,
4. all consumers deposit, and patient consumers withdraw in period 2.
Clearly, cases 1, and 2 above are an equilibrium, for any interest rate
offered by the bank — these two cases correspond to part 1 of Proposition 1.
It is also clear that if every consumer deposits, then it cannot be the case
that both patient and impatient consumers will withdraw — i.e., that case
3 above is not possible in equilibrium. This follows because any consumer
would prefer not to deposit given this strategy as
∫ 1
0
αa(r, 0|t)rf(t)dt ≤ 1,
and consumers are risk averse. Thus, in order to complete the proof of Propo-
sition 1, we are left to show that there exist an equilibrium in which patient
consumers wait, and that all of these equilibria have the stated properties.
We first construct an equilibrium in which all consumers deposit, and all
patient consumers wait to withdraw in period 2. Unlike the three previous
cases, in this case consumers behavior depends on the interest rate offered
by the bank. In particular, suppose that the bank offer an interest rate equal
10A more precise statement is as follows: if S denotes the set of symmetric equilibria,
A the set of symmetric equilibria described in 1, and B the set of symmetric equilibria
described in 2, we have that S = A ∪B, A ∩B = ∅, A 6= ∅, and B 6= ∅.
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to r, all consumers deposit, and all patient consumers wait for the second
period to withdraw. Then, the expected utility for a patient consumers equal∫ 1
0
u
(
max
{
R(1− tr)
1− t , 0
})
f(t)dt. (6)
If one patient consumer decides to withdraw in period 1, then his expected
utility when all the other patient consumer withdraw in period 2 is given by∫ 1
0
u(r)α1(r|t)f(t)dt. (7)
Thus, letting
W =
{
r ∈ [1, R] :
∫ 1
0
u
(
max
{
R(1− tr)
1− t , 0
})
f(t)dt ≥∫ 1
0
u(r)α1(r|t)f(t)dt
}
,
(8)
we have that any patient consumer will choose to withdraw in period 2 pro-
vided that r belongs to W , all consumers deposits, and all other patient
consumers wait for period 2 to withdraw.
From the above, we conclude that in an equilibrium of the type described
in case 4, a patient consumers receives an utility of
u
(
max
{
R(1− tr)
1− t , 0
})
, (9)
and a impatient consumer receives an utility of
αi(r|t)u(r), (10)
when the fraction of impatient consumers is equal to t. Thus, the ex-ante
expected utility of any consumer in this type of equilibrium is
U(r) :=
∫ 1
0
[
tαi(r|t)u(r) + (1− t)u
(
max
{
R(1− tr)
1− t , 0
})]
f(t)dt. (11)
If a consumer decides not to deposit, then his ex-ante expected utility is
simply ∫ 1
0
[tu(1) + (1− t)u(R)] f(t)dt. (12)
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Hence, letting
D =
{
r ∈ [1, R] : U(r) ≥
∫ 1
0
[tu(1) + (1− t)u(R)] f(t)dt
}
, (13)
we see that any consumer will choose to deposit provided that r belongs to
D, all other consumers deposits, and all patient consumers wait for period 2
to withdraw.
Finally, if the bank offers r∗ which maximizes U in the set D ∩W , we
can construct a symmetric equilibrium in the following way: the bank offers
r∗, and the consumers choose
d∗(r) =
{
1 if r ∈ D ∩W
0 otherwise,
(14)
w∗(r, d, 2) =
{
0 if r ∈ D ∩W and d = 1
1 otherwise,
(15)
and w∗(r, d, 1) = 1 for all (r, d).
Of course, in order to be able to construct the above strategy, we need to
show the existence of r∗. This is done in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The function U has a maximizer in D ∩W .
Proof. Note that the set D ∩W is compact, and non-empty, since r = 1
belong to D∩W . The function U is a continuous function of r. Hence, there
exist r∗ that maximizes U in D ∩W .
We have shown so far that there are two types of equilibria: in one type
nobody deposits, and in the other type everyone deposits, and patient con-
sumers withdraw in period 2. In order to complete the proof of Proposition
1, we are left to show that in every equilibrium of the second type, we have
r∗ > 1. Note that r∗ > 1 implies a strictly positive probability of a bank
failure: since the bank has to pay r∗t in the first period, we see that, with
probability 1− F (1/r∗) > 0, the banks fails.
Lemma 2 In every symmetric equilibrium such that every agent deposits,
and all patient agents wait, we have r∗ > 1.
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Proof. It suffices to show that there exists r˜ > 1 such that r˜ belongs to
D ∩W , and U(r˜) > U(1), which in turn implies that r∗ > 1.
Let WL(r) (resp. WR(r)) denote the left-hand (resp. right-hand) side
of the inequality defining the set W . Since WL(1) = u(R) > u(1) = WR(1),
we conclude that there exists a ball B around of 1 contained in W .
Note that D = {r ∈ [1, R] : U(r) ≥ U(1)}. Therefore, to prove existence
of r˜ > 1 such that r˜ ∈ D ∩W , and U(r˜) > U(1), it is enough to show that
lim
r↘1
U(r)− U(1)
r − 1 > 0. (16)
This is so, because if equation 16 holds, then it cannot be the case that
U(r)−U(1)
r−1 ≤ 0 for all r > 1 in the ball B around 1. Thus, there exist r˜ > 1
in B ⊆ W such that U(r˜)−U(1)
r−1 > 0; this, of course, implies that U(r˜) > U(1),
and r˜ ∈ D.
Let g(r) = R(1− tr)/(1− t). We have that
U(r)− U(1)
r − 1 =∫ 1/r
0
[
t
u(r)− u(1)
r − 1 + (1− t)
u ◦ g(r)− u ◦ g(1)
r − 1
]
f(t)dt+
1
r − 1
∫ 1
1/r
[t(αi(r|t)u(r)− u(1))− (1− t)u(R)]f(t)dt.
(17)
Since the following holds
1
r − 1
∫ 1
1/r
[t(αi(r|t)u(r)− u(1))− (1− t)u(R)]f(t)dt ≥
1
r − 1
∫ 1
1/r
[t(−u(1)) + (1− t)(−u(R))]f(t)dt ≥
− u(R) 1
r − 1
∫ 1
1/r
f(t)dt =
− u(R)F (1)− F (1/r)
r − 1 → −f(1)u(R) = 0,
(18)
we are left to show that
lim
r↘1
∫ 1/r
0
[
t
u(r)− u(1)
r − 1 + (1− t)
u ◦ g(r)− u ◦ g(1)
r − 1
]
f(t)dt > 0. (19)
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Note that g′(r)u′(g(r)) = −u′(R)Rt/(1− t). Defining
hr(t) =
{ [
tu(r)−u(1)
r−1 + (1− t)u◦g(r)−u◦g(1)r−1
]
f(t) if t ∈ [0, 1/r]
0 otherwise,
(20)
we see that limr→1 hr(t) = [u′(1) − Ru′(R)]tf(t). Thus, by the Lebesgue
Dominated Convergence Theorem, we obtain
lim
r↘1
∫ 1/r
0
[
t
u(r)− u(1)
r − 1 + (1− t)
u ◦ g(r)− u ◦ g(1)
r − 1
]
f(t)dt =
lim
r↘1
∫ 1
0
hr(t)dt =
[u′(1)−Ru′(R)]
∫ 1
0
tf(t)dt > 0,
(21)
since u′(1) > Ru′(R) (see Diamond and Dybvig [8], footnote 2) and
∫ 1
0
tf(t)dt >
0.
Proposition 1 fully analyzes symmetric equilibria where banks are not
allowed to suspend payments. We next study the case where suspension is
allowed.
5 Suspension of Withdrawals
We now consider the case where banks are allowed to suspend withdrawals,
and where every agent deposits. The banks are free to suspend withdrawals
when their assets reach a fraction s ∈ [0, 1] of the deposits. (The case where
the banks choose not to suspend withdrawals corresponds to s = 0.) The
choice of the fraction s is part of the banks’ strategy. An equilibrium in this
new framework is similar to the previous one, with the additional property
that the fraction s chosen by the banks is now an equilibrium variable.
It is straightforward to see that, when banks are allowed to suspend
withdrawals, bank failures are ruled out in any equilibrium where all the
agents deposit.
We next carry out a welfare comparison of the systems with and without
suspension of withdrawals. The next proposition shows that under a system
with suspension of withdrawals, agents’ welfare is strictly higher than under
a system without suspension of withdrawals. Together with the previous
16
results, this last proposition strongly suggests that suspension of withdrawals
might be a critical part of the protection of the banking system.
In order to prove that agents’ welfare is strictly higher when banks are
allowed to suspend withdrawals, we proceed as follows. Given that banks
maximize ex-ante welfare of the agents, and given that not suspending with-
drawals is part of the banks’ strategies (s = 0), we show that in every equilib-
rium banks will choose suspension. Moreover, she show that agents’ welfare
is strictly increasing in a positive neighborhood of s = 0.
Let U(r, s) denote consumers’ ex-ante expected utility when the bank
offer an interest rate r, and suspends payments at s.
Proposition 2 Let r > 1 be such that every agent chooses to deposit (d∗(r, 0) =
1), and such that every patient agent chooses not to withdraw in period 1
(w∗(r, 0, d∗(r, 0), 2) = 0). Then there exists s∗ > 0 such that d∗(r, s∗) = 1,
w∗(r, s∗, d∗(r, s∗), 2) = 0 and
U(r∗, s∗) > U(r∗, 0). (22)
Proof. Note first that by suspending withdrawals, banks give more in-
centives for a patient consumer to wait. Thus, we are left to show that the
bank can increase consumers’ ex-ante utility by suspending withdrawals.
We have that
U(r, 0) =
∫ 1
r
0
[
tu(r) + (1− t)u
(
R(1− tr)
1− t
)]
f(t)dt+∫ 1
1
r
tαi(r, 0|t)u(r)f(t)dt,
(23)
and that
U(r, s) =
∫ 1−s
r
0
[
tu(r) + (1− t)u
(
R(1− tr)
1− t
)]
f(t)dt
+
∫ 1
1−s
r
[
tαi(r, s|t)u(r) + (1− t)u
(
R(1− t′r)
1− t′
)]
f(t)dt,
(24)
where t′ = (1− s)/r.
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Then we obtain that
U(r, s)− U(r, 0) =
∫ 1
r
1−s
r
[t (αi(r, s|t)− 1) u(r)] f(t)dt
+
∫ 1
r
1−s
r
[
(1− t)
(
u
(
R(1− t′r)
1− t′
)
− u
(
R(1− tr)
1− t
))]
f(t)dt
+
∫ 1
1
r
[
t(αi(r, s|t)− αi(r, 0|t))u(r) + (1− t)u
(
R(1− t′r)
1− t′
)]
f(t)dt.
(25)
We claim that
lim
s→0+
U(r, s)− U(r, 0)
s
= +∞, (26)
which implies the existence of s∗ > 0 such that U(r∗, s∗) > U(0). This in
turn implies that s∗ > 0.
Note first that
1
s
∫ 1
1
r
(1− t)u
(
R(1− t′r)
1− t′
)
f(t)dt =
∫ 1
1
r
(1− t)
u
(
R(1−t′r)
1−t′
)
− u(0)
s
f(t)dt.
(27)
Since u′(0) = +∞, and lims→0+ R(1− t′r)/(1− t′) = 0 we see that this term
converges to infinity as s converges to 0.
Furthermore,
lim
s→0+
1
s
∫ 1
1
r
t(αi(r, s|t)− αi(r, 0|t))u(r)f(t)dt =∫ 1
0
t
∂αi(r, 0|t)
∂s
u(r)f(t)dt,
(28)
and so, we conclude that this term is bounded below. Hence, to finish the
proof it is enough to show that
1
s
∫ 1
r
1−s
r
[t (αi(r, s|t)− 1)u(r)] f(t)dt
+
1
s
∫ 1
r
1−s
r
[
(1− t)
(
u
(
R(1− t′r)
1− t′
)
− u
(
R(1− tr)
1− t
))]
f(t)dt
(29)
is bounded below.
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The continuity of αi and u allow us to find B ∈ R such that
t (αi(r, s|t)− 1) u(r) + (1− t)
(
u
(
R(1− t′r)
1− t′
)
− u
(
R(1− tr)
1− t
))
≥ B,
(30)
for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, it follows that
1
s
∫ 1
r
1−s
r
[t (αi(r, s|t)− 1)u(r)] f(t)dt
+
1
s
∫ 1
r
1−s
r
[
(1− t)
(
u
(
R(1− t′r)
1− t′
)
− u
(
R(1− tr)
1− t
))]
f(t)dt
≥ B
s
∫ 1
r
1−s
r
f(t)dt = B
F (1
r
)− F (1−s
r
)
s
→ B
r
f
(
1
r
)
.
(31)
This completes the proof.
The above result states that in every equilibrium such that agents deposit,
banks will chose to suspend payments. We are left to show that such an
equilibrium exists. An important feature of proposition 1 is existence of such
an equilibrium when suspension is not allowed.
We next establish a similar result when suspension is allowed. Still, in
every such equilibrium, it is straightforward to see that suspension will occur
with strictly positive probability.
However, in the Appendix, we show that the next result obtain with a
weakened assumption of the density of probability f (namely, the next result
holds when a fraction of patient agents with strictly positive measure is drawn
with probability 1).
The intuition and motivation for this next result are similar to the ones
in proposition 1.
Proposition 3 There exists an equilibrium such that r∗∗ > 1, s∗∗ > 0,
d∗(r∗) = 1, and w∗(r∗, d∗(r∗), 2) = 0.
The consumers’ ex-ante welfare with (r∗∗, s∗∗) is strictly higher then with
(r∗, 0), where r∗ is as in Proposition 1. Furthermore, the probability that the
bank suspend payments in this equilibrium is strictly positive.
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Proof. Let
W =
{
(r, s) ∈ [1, R]× [0, 1] :
∫ 1−s
r
0
u
(
R(1− tr)
1− t
)
f(t)dt+(
1− F
(
1− s
r
))
u
(
R(1− s)
1− 1−s
r
)
≥
∫ 1
0
u(r)α1(r, s|t)f(t)dt
}
,
(32)
and let
D = {(r, s) ∈ [1, R]× [0, 1] : U(r, s) ≥∫ 1
0
[tu(1) + (1− t)u(R)] f(t)dt
}
,
(33)
where
U(r, s) :=
∫ 1−s
r
0
[
tu(r) + (1− t)u
(
R(1− tr)
1− t
)]
f(t)dt
+
∫ 1
1−s
r
[
tαi(r, s|t)u(t) + (1− t)u
(
R(1− t′r)
1− t′
)]
f(t)dt,
(34)
and t′ = (1− s)/r.
We have that, for every (r, s) ∈ D ∩ W , every consumer deposits, and
every patient consumer does not withdraw early.
Consider now the following strategy: the bank offers (r∗∗, s∗∗) that max-
imizes U(r, s) in D ∩W , and consumers choose
d∗(r, s) =
{
1 if (r, s) ∈ D ∩W
0 otherwise,
w∗(r, s, d, 2) =
{
0 if (r, s) ∈ D ∩W and d = 1
1 otherwise,
and w∗(r, s, d, 1) = 1 for all (r, s, d).
To prove existence of an equilibrium with the above properties, it is
enough to show that the following program
max
r,s
U(r, s)
subject to (r, d) ∈ D ∩W
20
has a solution.
To do so, it is is straightforward to show that both sets W and D are
compact. Moreover, (r, s) = (1, 0) belong to D∩W . Therefore, the set D∩W
is nonempty and compact. Since the objective function is continuous on this
last set, the program has a solution.
Let r∗ be as in Proposition 1. Then, (r∗, 0) belong to D ∩ W , and, for
any s > 0, we have
U(1, s) = U(1, 0) < U(r∗, 0).
Hence, the solution to the above problem (r∗∗, s∗∗), will have r∗∗ > 1, and
therefore, s∗∗ > 0, by Proposition 2. The proof is now complete.
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6 Conclusion
We used the standard Diamond and Dibvig [8] to show that bank runs (asso-
ciated with the idea of consumers’ panic) are not the only theoretical explana-
tion for bank failures driven by large withdrawals. We show that even when
consumers do not panic, an unexpectedly high level of consumers in need for
liquid assets early may lead the whole banking industry to fail. Moreover,
allowing for suspension of payments achieves strictly higher consumers’ wel-
fare. It follows that, at least from a theoretical standpoint, suspension of
payments might be a critical part of the protection of the banking system.
The main point of this paper is that bank failures, and suspension of
payments, can have a fundamental explanation. Any (relatively unlikely)
fundamental shock that leads to a large number of withdrawals, will lead
to bank failures, or to suspension of payments. Hence, we suggest that
future research should focus on what fundamental shocks can lead to large
withdrawals. This is a challenge we take on Carmona and Leoni [6], where
we suggest that such a fundamental shock might be a severe recession.
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A Appendix
A.1 Alpha
In this appendix, we present a model yielding functions αy, y = a, i, 1 for
which all our results hold. Let nature first chooses t according to f . Then,
independently, it chooses t0 ∈ [0, 1] according to the uniform distribution,
and picks consumers in [t0, (t0 + t)mod1] to be impatient (it is convenient to
think of the interval [0, 1] as a circle). Independently of t0, and of t, nature
chooses p ∈ [0, 1], again according to the uniform distribution, to be the first
consumer to arrive at the bank, which will be followed by those to his right
(modulo 1).11
By symmetry, it is enough to consider consumer 0. If all consumer with-
draw in the first period, then consumer 0 will be able to consume provided
that 1− (1− p)r ≥ s, that is, p ≥ 1− (1− s)/r. Thus,
αa(r, s|t) = 1− s
r
. (36)
For the case when only impatient consumers withdraw in period 1, as-
suming that consumer 0 is impatient implies that t0 ∈ [1 − t, 1]; thus, con-
ditioning will be needed. Assume first that (1 − s)/rt ≤ 1. We obtain that
if t0 ∈ [1− t, 1− (1− s)/r], then for consumer 0 to be able to withdraw we
need 1 − (1 − p)r ≥ s, that is, p ≥ 1 − (1 − s)/r. If t0 ∈ [1 − (1 − s)/r, 1]
then p need to be greater or equal to x, where x solves
1− r [(1− t0) + (t0 + t− 1)− x] = s (37)
, and so p ≥ t− (1− s)/r. Hence,
αi(r, s) =
1
t
(∫ 1− 1−s
r
1−t
1− s
r
dt0 +
∫ 1
1− 1−s
r
(
1− t+ 1− s
r
)
dt0
)
=
1− s
rt
.
(38)
11More precisely, the purpose of the variable p is to define an order on [0, 1], as follows:
consumer x arrives to the bank before consumer z if h(x) < h(z), where
h(x) =
{
x− 0.5 if x ≥ p
x+ 0.5 otherwise. (35)
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Finally, if (1− s)/rt > 1, then clearly, αi(r, s|t) = 1. Thus,
αi(r, s|t) = min
{
1− s
tr
, 1
}
. (39)
Finally, we have the case when one patient consumer withdraw in period
1 in addition to all the impatient ones. We obtain
α1(r, s) =
{
1−t
2
+ 1−s
r
if rt ≤ 1− s
1 otherwise.
(40)
The last expression can be obtained as follow: again suppose that consumer
0 is the patient consumer who chooses to withdraw in period 1. This implies
that t0 can only be between 0, and 1− t. Given t0, then he can withdraw if
and only if 1− r(t0+ t− p) ≥ s, that is, if and only if, p ≥ t0+ t− (1− s)/r.
Thus,
α1(r, s|t) = 1
1− t
∫ 1−t
0
(1− t0 − t+ 1− s
r
)dt0 =
1− t
2
+
1− s
r
. (41)
One can easily show that all these function are continuous almost ev-
erywhere (with respect to the Lebesgue measure) separately on (r, s), and
t. Furthermore, the partial derivative of αi with respect to s exists and is
bounded almost everywhere. As one can also easily check, these properties
are sufficient for our results.
A.2 Robustness
In this section, we show that the strictly positive probability of an equi-
librium bank failure in proposition 1 does not depend on the assumption
that every fraction of impatient consumers has strictly positive probability.
We now assume that there exists a maximal fraction (strictly less than one)
of impatient agents possibly drawn, and we show that a result identical to
proposition 1 obtains.
We can also obtain similar results to Proposition 1 and Proposition 2
with this last assumption on the distribution of patient agents. For sake of
briefness, we omit them.
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Before presenting the next result, we introduce the following notation:
Let t ∈ [0, 1], and let (c∗1(t), c∗2(t)) be the solution to
max
c1(t),c2(t)
tu(c1(t)) + (1− t)u(c2(t))
subject to tc1(t) +
(1− t)c2(t)
R
= 1.
(42)
We next state the result.
Proposition 4 Suppose that there exists t¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that F (t¯) = 1, f is
continuous, F (t) < 1 for all t ∈ [0, t¯), and f(t¯) = 0. Let r¯ = c∗1(t¯).
There are two classes of symmetric equilibria:
1. no agent deposits; i.e, d∗(r∗) = 0.
2. every agent deposits, every patient agent waits, and the interest rate of-
fered by the banks exceed 1; i.e, r∗ > r¯, d∗(r∗) = 1, and w∗(r∗, d∗(r∗), 2) =
0. In every equilibrium in this class, the ex-ante expected utility of
the agents is strictly greater than in the previous class. Moreover, the
banks fail in the first period with strictly positive probability (equal to
1− F (1/r∗)).
Proof. The proof is almost similar to the proof of proposition 1. We
only need show that: (a) U(r) < U(r¯) if r < r¯, and (b) there exists r˜ > r¯
such that r˜ belongs to D ∩W , and U(r˜) > U(r¯).
In order to prove (a), we next show that
tu(r) + (1− t)u
(
R(1− tr)
1− t
)
< tu(r¯) + (1− t)u
(
R(1− tr¯)
1− t
)
, (43)
for every r < r¯, and every t < t¯.
Pick r < r¯, and also pick t < t¯. Consider the following problem:
max
c1,c2
tu(c1) + (1− t)u(c2)
subject to tc1 +
(1− t)c2
R
= 1
and c1 ≤ r¯.
(44)
A necessary condition for a maximum is that
[c1 − r¯]
[
u′(c1)−Ru′
(
R(1− tr¯)
1− t
)]
= 0. (45)
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Since c1 ≤ r¯, and t < t¯, it follows that
u′(c1) ≥ u′(r¯) = Ru′
(
R(1− t¯r¯)
1− t¯
)
> Ru′
(
R(1− tc1)
1− t
)
, (46)
and so c1 = r¯. Thus,
tu(r) + (1− t)u
(
R(1− tr)
1− t
)
< tu(r¯) + (1− t)u
(
R(1− tr¯)
1− t
)
. (47)
In order to prove (b), we note first that r¯ ∈ D ∩W . By (1), we see that
U(r¯) > U(1), and so D contains a neighborhood of r¯. Similarly, W contains
a neighborhood of r¯, since
LW (r¯) =
∫ t¯
0
u
(
R(1− tr¯)
1− t
)
f(t)dt
>
∫ t¯
0
u(r¯)f(t)dt
= RW (r¯).
(48)
Finally, we will show that
lim
r↘r¯
U(r)− U(r¯)
r − r¯ > 0, (49)
which implies the existence of r˜ > r¯ such that r˜ ∈ D ∩W , and U(r˜) > U(r¯).
Let g(r) = R(1− tr)/(1− t). We have that
U(r)− U(r¯)
r − r¯ =∫ 1/r
0
[
t
u(r)− u(r¯)
r − r¯ + (1− t)
u ◦ g(r)− u ◦ g(r¯)
r − r¯
]
f(t)dt+
1
r − r¯
∫ t¯
1/r
[t(αi(1/r|t)u(r)− u(r¯))− (1− t)u(R)]f(t)dt.
(50)
As in the proof of Proposition 1, we can show that
lim
r↘r¯
1
r − r¯
∫ t¯
1/r
[t(αi(1/r|t)u(r)− u(r¯))− (1− t)u(R)]f(t)dt = 0, (51)
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and that
lim
r↘r¯
∫ 1/r
0
[
t
u(r)− u(r¯)
r − r¯ + (1− t)
u ◦ g(r)− u ◦ g(r¯)
r − r¯
]
f(t)dt =∫ 1/r¯
0
[
u′(r¯)−Ru′
(
R(1− tr¯)
1− t
)]
f(t)dt.
(52)
Since u′(r¯) > Ru′
(
R(1−tr¯)
1−t
)
whenever t < t¯, we conclude that
lim
r↘r¯
U(r)− U(r¯)
r − r¯ > 0. (53)
The proof is now complete.
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